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deterrant to sizeable non-nuclear aggression, below ~~the~~ level of unmistakable a clear and unmistakable/general attack, which is intended to present NATO with a fait accompli. ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ In extension of this thought, ~~the~~ U.S. considers that:

- a. In ~~the~~ event of nuclear attack, or of a non-nuclear attack with which NATO non-nuclear forces clearly could not cope, there must be no hesitation in applying ~~the~~ full force at NATO's disposal, including external strategic forces if they should be required.
- b. For ~~the~~ intermediate case, NATO must be capable of responding with force which is suitable and adequate. Against non-nuclear aggression of limited or indeterminate size, NATO's initial response should be non-nuclear. Such response, if backed up by adequate nuclear and non-nuclear strength, should permit adequate time for a Soviet political decision to terminate hostilities or for a NATO political decision concerning use of nuclear weapons. ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Again ~~the~~ U.S. reaffirms its intention to maintain strategic forces capable of defeating Soviet forces, and, if necessary, of devastating ~~the~~ Soviet Union; it is determined to use these forces in ~~the~~ common defense of its NATO Allies if that should prove necessary. ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Particularly in light of ~~the~~ Berlin situation, but for ~~the~~ long term as well, ~~the~~ U.S. considers that ~~the~~ most urgent task facing ~~the~~ Alliance is that of increasing now the non-nuclear strength of our forces in Central Europe; a task in which we are engaged. It is ~~the~~ opinion of ~~the~~ U.S. that these forces should possess ~~the~~ capability to meet non-nuclear aggression above ~~the~~ level contemplated

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by a literal, narrow, interpretation of ~~the~~ Political Directive (C-M(56)138(Final)) and ~~the~~ Strategic Concept (MC 14/2 Revised). As indicated by their comments expressed in ~~the~~ Council meeting on 18 September, it appears that this view is generally shared by ~~the~~ members of ~~the~~ Council. ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~the~~ U.S. Continues to recognize ~~the~~ necessity to use nuclear weapons including ~~the~~ external strategic forces, in general war, and has never advocated any change in, or reinterpretation of, this aspect of these directives. However, ~~the~~ U.S. does not agree that NATO should permit, or in fact encourage, general war to occur through its failure to provide ~~the~~ forces needed to deal with, where appropriate, a lesser alternative. ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ In order to carry through these thoughts, ~~the~~ U.S. approves ~~the~~ SYG paper (P0/61/714) subject to ~~the~~ following changes:

Para 1. Omit ~~the~~ bracketed portion recommended by ~~the~~ Military Authorities from this paragraph and include this same thought in paragraph 7 as discussed below.

Para 5. In ~~the~~ fourth sentence, after ~~the~~ words 'remain valid' insert 'broadly interpreted.'

Reason: as indicated in ~~the~~ U.S. presentation of 26 April 1961, we do not recommend any change in ~~the~~ wording of ~~the~~ Political Directive or of ~~the~~ Strategic Concept, but we do believe that we should recognize that a broader, more constructive, interpretation is required. Accordingly, we do not wish to reaffirm a literal, narrow interpretation which we do not consider to be in ~~the~~ best interest of ~~the~~ Alliance.

Para 7

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Para. 7. Delete ~~the~~ last three sentences and substitute following: QUOTE  
It is necessary to give NATO a wider choice of effective response to aggression  
than either unnecessarily going to general war or leaving ~~the~~ enemy to determine  
~~the~~ intensity of action at each stage ~~MEASURE~~.

Reason: Here again, we do not wish to reaffirm a literal, narrow interpretation  
of our basic directives; an interpretation that would serve to limit even ~~the~~  
flexibility which has been developed by interpretation during ~~the~~ past several  
years. In ~~the~~ past, SACEUR has spoken of QUOTE Raising ~~the~~ Threshold ~~MEASURE~~ UNQUOTE  
~~MEASURE~~ and of QUOTE ~~the~~ pause UNQUOTE, both of which serve to give a broader  
interpretation to these directives. Our change is intended to recognize ~~the~~  
necessity for, and ~~the~~ advantages of, having a wider range of alternatives than  
an all or nothing response. ~~MEASURE~~

~~MEASURE~~. Para 8. Delete ~~the~~ first sentence.

Reason: This sentence is not necessary, and its inclusion is awkward when ~~the~~  
last three sentences of para 7 are deleted.

Para 9. Delete ~~the~~ clause in ~~the~~ first sentence which reads: QUOTE which  
in fact reaffirm ~~the~~ validity of ~~the~~ Political Directive (C-M(56)138(Final) and  
of ~~the~~ Strategic Concept (MC 14/2 Revised) in ~~the~~ light of present circumstances.  
~~MEASURE~~.

Reason: This clause is not necessary to ~~the~~ purpose of ~~the~~ sentence, which is to  
cause ~~the~~ Military authorities to take action on ~~the~~ 1966 force requirements. Its  
inclusion would negate ~~the~~ attempt to provide ~~the~~ broader interpretation ~~which we~~  
consider necessary. ~~MEASURE~~

*Borries*  
ACTING

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